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CASENOTES
Another exception to the rule' is that states can refuse to give effect
to foreign laws wherever they are considered contrary to legislative acts
violating international law'0 or legislation enacted ultra vires of the
internationally recognized jurisdiction of sovereign states.' 7  States may
refuse, also, to give effect to acts of unrecognized governments; 8 however,
effect can be given to acts of unrecognized governments if public policy
so requires.' 9 It was not necessary for the court to consider this exception.
The doctrine, that private rights acquired under the laws of foreign
states will be respected and enforced in our courts, enunciated in Hilton
v. Guyot2 0 has been universally accepted.2 1 Thus it is seen that not only
foreign acts, but also foreign judgments are respected in our courts with
a few exceptions as previously noted.
It appears as though the courts here have stopped, looked and listened,
and have taken the old reliable road of sacrosanctity rather than forging
ahead.22  Therefore as the law stands to date, our courts will not sit in
judgment on the validity of acts done by a sovereign government within
its legislative, judicial or administrative jurisdiction.
Robert G. Greenberg
CONFLICT OF LAWS-PENAL OR REMEDIAL STATUTES
An action was brought against stockholders of a bankrupt Arkansas
corporation in a Tennessee court. Recovery was sought under the Arkansas
law' which imposed individual liability upon defendants as partners, when
articles of incorporation had not been filed with the county clerk.2
Held, the Arkansas statute being penal in nature, the Tennessee court
need not afford it full faith and credit. Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell,
263 SAV.2d 127 (Tenn. 1953).
15. Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. D. 489 (1887). British
courts refused to give effect to Peruvian laws annulling acts of the preceding Peruvian
government because by the international law of government successions, plaintiff
government, was bound by the acts of the preceding Peruvian government.
16. Anglo-iranian Oil Co. v. SocietS Unione Petrolifera Orientale, 47 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 509 (1953).
17. Salimoff v. Standard Oil, 237 App. Div. 686, 262 N.Y. Supp. 693 (1st Dep't.),
affd, 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
18. Luther v. Sagor, 3 K.B. 532 (1921).
19. See note 17 sura.
20. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
21. Id. at 233.
22. Comment, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 400 (1953).
1. AR. STAT. § 64-103 (1947).
2. Under the decisions of the Arkansas court of last resort, as required by the
Arkansas statute, stockholders of a corporation are liable as partners when the charter
is not filed in the county where the principal office of the corporation is to be
maintained. Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1953);
Gazette Publishing Co. v. Brady, 204 Ark. 396, 162 S.W.2d 494 (1942).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
It is generally rccognized that a penal statute of one state need not
be enforced by the courts of other states.: It is likewise generally recognized
that a statute is penal if its purpose is to punish an offense against the
public justice of the state in which it was enacted.' If the statute in
question is designed merelv to afford a remedy to an individual, and not
primarily to punish an offense against the state, it is not penal. ' Normally,
the penalty is expressly set out in the statute." The Arkansas statute
involved in the instant case expresses no penalty; its pelnal nature, if any,
is derived from judicial decisions.'
In deciding a case embracing the identical statute and question
involved in the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
6th Circuit reached a conclusion directly opposed to that of the Tennessee
court.8
The issue presented by the conflicting decisions in the state and
federal courts is whether the state in which the action is brought is
bound by the construction placed upon the statute by the court of the
state in which it was enacted. The question is not one of local law but
of conflict of laws or international law. Hence, whether or not a statute
is penal and unenforceable extraterritorially is to be determined by the
court wherein the suit is brought.10 It follows, then, that the court of
the forum is not absolutely bound by the construction placed on the
statute by the courts of the state which enacted it.' There is some
authority that the construction given to a statute by the courts of the
state of its enactment conclusively establishes the character of such
statute.' 2  The cases which stand for this proposition, however, are
concerned with situations where the enacting state's court held the statute
to be penal. Therefore, the statute when so interpreted would never-
theless be unenforceable outside its own jurisdiction.:'
The federal court, in deciding its case,' 4 based its decision upon
Huntington v. Attril,' wherein it was held that the full faith and credit
3. People v, Crucible Steel Co. of America, 151 Mich. 618, 115 N.W. 705
(1908); Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co, v. Wenatchee Land Co., 122 Minn. 266, 142
N.W. 305 (1913); Cary v. Schmcltz, 141 Mo. App. 570, 125 S.W. 532 (1910);
Wellman v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 107 At. 396 (1919).
4. Ibid.
5. Whitlow v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R., 114 Tenn. 304, 84 S.W.
618 (1904),
6. N.Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS C. 611, §§ 21, 37 (1875).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1953). This
case was decided eight days prior to the instant case, coming to the Court of Appeals
on appeal from the Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
9. Great Western Machinery Co. v. Smith, 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414 (1912).
10. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
11. Gardner v. Rumsey, 81 Okla. 20, 196 Pac. 941 (1921).
12. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Kirk, 222 Pa. 567, 71 At]. 1085 (1909).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. See note 8 supra.
15. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
CASENOTES
clause of the Constitution required the Maryland court to give effect to
a New York statute 0 said to be penal in nature. In that case, however,
the plaintiff sought to enforce a judgment based upon a foreign statute.
The purpose of the proceedings in the instant case was to procure a
judgment, the attempted basis for recovery being a foreign statute."
Even considering the distinction between enforcing and procuring
judgments, the question of whether foreign judgments under penal statutes
are entitled to full faith and credit is itself still an open one.18
It is apparent, considering the great weight of authority supporting
the decision of the Tennessee court, that the federal court reached an
erroneous decision. That the court realized its inadvertence is evident,
for subsequent to the decision of the Tennessee court in the instant case,
the federal court granted a rehearing and reversed itself.' 9 Oddly enough
the Huntington case, upon which the court's original opinion was based,
contained dictum which virtually compelled the rcversal.
Jerry Mosca
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WAIVER OF VENUE-
STATE NON-RESIDENT VEHICLE STATUTE
An Illinois corporation brought suit in a federal district court of
Kentucky against an Indiana resident for damages arising from an automobile
accident occurring in the State of Kentucky. W\Vith jurisdiction in federal
court based on diversity of citizenship, service of process upon defendant
was made in accordance with the Kentucky Non-Resident Motorvist
Statute.' Defendant challenged venue as being improperly laid in a district
not the residence of either party.2 A motion to dismiss on this ground
was overruled and the jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court.8  Held, on appeal, reversed. Defendant did not waive his federal
venue privilege by virtue of the state non-resident motorist statute.
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 74 Sup. Ct. 83 (1953).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
18. Compare Fauntleroy v. Lurn, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), With Milwaukee County
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
19. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
20. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892). "The test is not by what
name the statute is called by the Legislature or the courts of the state in which it
was passed, but whether it appears, to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it,
to be . . . , a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right
to a private person." (Italics supplied.)
1. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 188.020-030 (1953).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (Supp. 1950): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is
founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."
3. Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 201 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1953).
